Iraq 2003: The Case That Collapsed

On 20 March 2003, British forces joined the United States in invading Iraq. The public case was hammered home for months: Saddam Hussein was said to be hiding weapons of mass destruction (WMD), refusing to disarm, and posing a grave threat. Tony Blair told Parliament that the UN route had hit its limit and that force was needed to enforce disarmament. In Washington, George W. Bush framed the invasion as an effort to disarm Iraq, free its people, and defend the world from danger. Behind the speeches sat one core claim: Iraq still had WMD, and the West could not afford to wait.

The public did not buy it. On 15 February 2003, coordinated protests swept more than 600 cities. London saw the largest demonstration in modern British history, with widely reported estimates around 1.5 million people. Across the same weekend, BBC reporting was widely cited as estimating between six and ten million people took part worldwide. That scale matters because it shows what governments ignored in real time: not a fringe, but a mass refusal. When leaders say they acted for security, this is what the public thought about the case that was being sold.

Internationally, the legal cover never became clean. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (adopted unanimously in November 2002) restarted inspections and warned Iraq of 'serious consequences' if it stayed in breach, but it did not explicitly authorise force.

In early 2003, the US, UK and Spain pushed a further resolution. It became clear it would not pass: France and Russia signalled they would oppose it, and the draft was never put to a vote. France, Germany and Russia publicly led the diplomatic resistance, arguing inspections should continue. Canada refused to join without a new UN resolution. Turkey's parliament rejected a motion that would have allowed a major US northern front. The picture was obvious: the war went ahead without the UN endorsement London had insisted was so important.

Then came the outcome that matters most: the central claim collapsed. UN inspectors reported no evidence of prohibited weapons programmes at the point they withdrew. After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group and the Duelfer findings concluded there were no stockpiles of WMD. The headline promise - disarm Iraq of hidden arsenals - turned into a negative. No caches. No deployable programme. What followed instead is the 'end result' Britain rarely sums up plainly: Saddam was removed, Iraq was occupied, violence surged, and a long, destabilising conflict spread across the region.

When the justification collapses, accountability should begin. Instead, Britain spent years defending process rather than truth. The Chilcot Inquiry later concluded the UK chose to join the invasion before peaceful options had been exhausted and that the intelligence was presented with a certainty that was not justified. Senior figures also described the invasion as illegal or potentially criminal. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. Former Lord Chief Justice Lord Bingham said the war was illegal. Archbishop Desmond Tutu argued Blair and Bush should face trial at the International Criminal Court. Michael Mansfield QC pursued legal action aimed at prosecuting Blair for the crime of aggression. Philippe Sands publicly discussed whether Blair could be indicted for aggression. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, a senior Foreign Office lawyer, resigned and later described an unlawful invasion as a 'crime of aggression'. That's not one angry campaigner - it's a line-up of establishment credibility.

Iraq 2003 is a case study in how Britain can help write the rules, bend them, and then defend the bend as if it were principle. When the evidence did not appear, the story shifted: disarmament became liberation; imminent threat became long-term risk; legality became interpretation; catastrophe became 'difficult choices'. If the UK wants to talk about standards and human rights with a straight face, it needs to start with basics: prove the case, obey the law, and tell the truth - especially when the decision is to kill and to occupy.

Sources (selected)

• UK Parliament (Hansard), Tony Blair statement on Iraq, 25 February 2003 and 18 March 2003.

• White House Archives: George W. Bush State of the Union (28 Jan 2003) and address launching military operations (19 Mar 2003).

• UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (8 Nov 2002).

• UN Press release: Hans Blix / UNMOVIC reported no evidence of prohibited programmes as of withdrawal (5 Jun 2003).

• France/Russia opposition and veto threat to a new draft resolution (March 2003 reporting). • 15-16 Feb 2003 protest estimates (London and worldwide; reporting citing BBC estimate). •Iraq Survey Group / Duelfer findings: no WMD stockpiles (2004) and follow-up reporting. • Chilcot Inquiry key findings (6 Jul 2016).

• Kofi Annan comments on illegality (15 Sep 2004).

• Lord Bingham comments on illegality (7-8 Feb 2010).

• Desmond Tutu call for ICC trial (2 Sep 2012).

• Michael Mansfield QC and related High Court coverage (31 Jul 2017).

• Elizabeth Wilmshurst resignation letter reporting (24 Mar 2005).

• Philippe Sands discussion of possible crime of aggression (25 Jan 2007).